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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 General principles of the Directive on deposit-guarantee schemes
Article 4 of European Parliament and Council Directive 94/19/EC of
30 May 1994 on deposit-guarantee schemes establishes the principle that
deposit-guarantee schemes introduced and officially recognised in a
Member State in accordance with Article 3(1) must cover the depositors at
branches set up by credit institutions in other Member States.1
This provision extends to deposit-guarantee schemes the principle of mutual
recognition in host Member States of the provisions applicable to the head office
of a credit institution which, together with its branches within the internal
market, forms a single entity subject to single authorisation and centralised
supervision of its activities.
The Directive did not harmonise schemes to the extent of laying down a uniform
level of cover. However, in Article 7 of the Directive, a minimum amount of
€20 000 is specified although until 31 December 1999 provision is made for
some Member States to maintain a lower level of cover (but not less than
€15 000). It is also stated that the guarantee provided may be limited to a
specified percentage of deposits (greater than or equal to 90%). Finally, no
maximum limit was laid down, and some depositors or deposits (as listed in
Annex I to the Directive) may be totally excluded from the guarantee.
Differences may therefore exist in the level and scope of guarantees provided by
the various systems,2 particularly during the five years’ transitional period when
the minimum amount of the guarantee might be subject of derogation.
1.2 The export prohibition clause
There exists a temporary derogation, valid until 31 December 1999, from the
application of the principle of extending the deposit guarantee of the home
Member State to that of branches established in other Member States. This
temporary exception, hereafter referred to as “the export prohibition clause”, is
given in article 4(1), second sub-paragraph, of the Directive. The wording of the
second and third subparagraphs of this Article is as follows:
1 Article 3(1) states that “Each Member State shall ensure that within its territory one or more
deposit-guarantee schemes are introduced and officially recognised.”
2 See annexed table.
3“Until 31 December 1999 neither the level nor the scope, including the
percentage of cover provided, shall exceed the maximum level or scope of cover
offered by the corresponding guarantee scheme within the territory of the host
Member State.
Before that date, the Commission shall draw up a report on the basis of the
experience acquired in applying the second subparagraph and shall consider the
need to continue those arrangements. If appropriate, the Commission shall
submit a proposal for a Directive to the European Parliament and the Council,
with a view to the extension of their validity.”3
Now the time has come to draw up the report on the application of the provision
in Article 4(1) and to examine whether there is a need to prolong the clause. To
do this it might be appropriate to take a closer look at the motives for the
introduction of the export prohibition clause and its interpretation when it has
been questioned before the Court. This is done in the next section. The
subsequent section assesses the experience of the clause and offers the
argumentation for and against the expiry of the clause. This report ends with the
Commission’s evaluation regarding the future of the clause.
2. INTERPRETATION OF THE EXPORT PROHIBITION CLAUSE
2.1 At the time of the adoption of the Directive
The reasoning behind the introduction of the export prohibition clause is
indicated in the 14th recital of the preamble of the Directive:
“Whereas market disturbances could be caused by branches of credit institutions
which offer levels of cover higher than those offered by credit institutions
authorised in their host Member States; whereas it is not appropriate that the
level or scope of cover offered by guarantee schemes should become an
instrument of competition; whereas it is therefore necessary, at least during an
initial period, to stipulate that the level and scope of cover offered by a home
Member State scheme to depositors at branches located in another Member State
should not exceed the maximum level and scope offered by the corresponding
scheme in the host Member State; whereas possible market disturbances should
be reviewed after a number of years, on the basis of the experience acquired and
in the light of developments in the banking sector;”
This wording did not originate in a Commission proposal, as is clearly indicated
by the report of the Council Presidency prior to the adoption of the Common
Position:
“In the course of proceedings in the Council, several delegations requested that
the Directive provides that, where a credit institution from a country where the
protection system is generous establishes a branch in a country where the
protection system is less generous, it cannot offer higher cover in that country
3 A similar temporary derogation is provided for in Article 7 of Directive 97/9/EC on inverstor-
compensation schemes (OJ L 84 of 26 March 1997, p. 22).
4than normally prevails there (non-export clause). The objective is to prevent the
branch from being in a more favourable competitive position than local credit
institutions.
Bearing in mind, on the one hand, the importance which certain delegations
attach to this clause which the Commission is reluctant to accept and, on the
other hand, the opinion of the Legal Service which considers such a clause to be
perhaps admissible only if it is temporary, the Presidency proposes the
following compromise:
Include in the Directive a clause prohibiting export but only until
31 December 1999. Before that date, the Council could decide to extend it on
the basis of a proposal from the Commission.”4
2.2 Following the action for annulment from the German Government
The export prohibition clause gave rise to an action5 for annulment from the
German Government on the following grounds:
(1) Failure to state reasons, as required by Article 190 of the EC Treaty, and
thus to allow the Court to exercise its power of review;
It was argued that the Council and Parliament had not specified why the
level and scope of cover should not become an instrument of
competition. The “export prohibition” was stated to contradict the
purpose of the Directive, which was to strengthen the protection afforded
to depositors and to facilitate cross-border activities of credit institutions
within the Community.
(2) Infringement of Article 57(2) of the EC Treaty; The explanation of this
argument was that the export prohibition complicated the exercise of
cross-banking activities within the Community and went against the
principle of minimum harmonisation and mutual recognition.
(3) Incompatibility of the export prohibition with the objective of protecting
savers; It was argued that since the export prohibition required branches
to reduce the level of cover to that offered by countries in which
protection was less generous, the clause run counter to the principle of
protecting creditors.
(4) Violation of the principle of proportionality from the point of view of
both need and proportionality; The first argument offered for this
objection was that the export prohibition clause violated the principle of
minimum intervention. Other solutions which would limit the activities
of credit institutions less would be just as effective for countering
marketing disturbances, e.g. a safeguard clause. The second argument
put forward was that there was no reasonable relationship between the
nature and scale of intervention and the usefulness of the export
4 Extract from the report of the (Belgian) Council Presidency, 9 September 1993, Council document
8520/93 EF 62.
5 Case C-233/94 Federal Republic of Germany v European Parliament and Council.
5prohibition. The usefulness was already limited by the mere fact that it
was not at all certain that the market would be disturbed.
The Court’s judgement of 13 May 1997 provides very important pointers to
assessing the conditions and limits surrounding the compatibility of the export
prohibition clause.
In point 43, the Court acknowledges that the export prohibition is an exception
to the minimum harmonisation and mutual recognition which the Directive
generally seeks to achieve. “However, in view of the complexity of the matter
and the differences between the legislation of the Member States, the Parliament
and the Council were empowered to achieve the necessary harmonisation
progressively.” In point 55, dealing with the alleged violation of proportionality,
the Court stressed that “the Community legislature was seeking to regulate an
economically complex situation. Before the adoption of the Directive,
deposit-guarantee schemes did not exist in all the Member States; moreover,
most of them did not cover depositors with branches set up by credit institutions
authorised in other Member States. The Community legislature therefore needed
to assess the future, uncertain effects of its action. In so doing, it could choose
between the general prevention of a risk and the establishment of a system of
specific protection” (point 55).
“According to the 14th recital in the preamble to the Directive, the Parliament
and the Council chose to avoid, from the very beginning, any market
disturbance resulting from the offer by branches of some credit institutions of
higher cover than that offered by credit institutions authorised by the host
Member State. Since the possibility of such a disturbance could not be wholly
ruled out, it follows that the Community legislature has shown to the requisite
legal standard that it was pursuing a legitimate objective. Moreover, the
restriction constituted by the export prohibition on the activities of the credit
institutions concerned is not manifestly disproportionate” (point 57).
After its action for annulment was rejected by the Court, Germany enacted in
July 1998 a Law setting up a general and compulsory deposit-guarantee scheme
covering credit institutions and investment firms up to the minimum Community
level (i.e. 90% of the deposit up to a total of ECU 20 000). The German
Government also recognised all pre-existing private guarantee schemes, which
are able to continue offering much higher cover on a voluntary and
supplementary basis. It is these private schemes which are at present charged
with managing the public guarantee fund (which does not have legal personality
and to which they have contributed) and with monitoring credit institutions and,
where necessary, paying the guarantee required by the Law.
3. ARGUMENTATION WHETHER THE CLAUSE SHOULD BE
PROLONGED OR LIFTED
3.1 The basis for evaluation
When reviewing the export prohibition clause, as requested by the Directive, it
seems particularly important to highlight the following two points.
6First, the preamble of the Directive states that “possible market disturbances
(resulting from the clause) should be reviewed after a number of years on the
basis of the experience acquired and in the light of developments in the banking
sector.”
Second, it has already been mentioned that an important condition for making a
temporary exception to the principles of minimum harmonisation and mutual
recognition, which the Directive generally seeks to achieve, is stated by the
Court as follows: “However, in view of the complexity of the matter and the
differences between the legislation of the Member States, the Parliament and the
Council were empowered to achieve the necessary harmonisation
progressively.” It might therefore be relevant to assess whether this situation
still prevails or not.
3.2 Justifications for maintaining the export prohibition clause.
The following major arguments have been put forward by certain Member
States as justifications for maintaining the clause:
(1) Lack of experience; At the time at which this report is being drawn up,
five years after the date on which the Directive entered into force, the
provision being examined at Parliament’s and the Council’s request has
never actually been exercised by the deposit-guarantee schemes which
exist in the Member States, as adapted or introduced when the Directive
was transposed into national law. This is because no credit institution
with branches in other Member States has, for reasons directly linked to
its financial situation, suspended the release of deposits placed with it
during the period under review.
(2) Risk of negative competitive effects; Governments in favour of the
Commission presenting a proposal for an extension of the clause’s
validity generally advance the argument contained in the Court judgment
that “the level and the scope of cover offered by the guarantee scheme
should not become an instrument of competition”, with the market
disturbances to which that might give rise. Governments consider that
the possibility of such a disturbance could not be wholly ruled out and
invoke the fact that the export prohibition for the activities of the credit
institutions concerned has not led to negative effects on their territory or
hampered the activities of their establishments in other Member States.
(3) A particularly sensitive period; Some Member States have pointed out
that it would be particularly inappropriate to let the clause expire at the
end of 1999 since this change would come on top of other changes in the
market which by themselves have increased the risk for market
disturbances. One such factor is the recent introduction of the Euro.
Another factor is the planned enlargement of the EU. It has been argued
that some candidate countries would be expected to have difficulties to
adopt the minimum deposit guarantee level. Some Member States are
therefore concerned that the expiry of the export prohibition clause could
considerably increase the risk of market disturbances.
73.3 Justifications for lifting the export prohibition clause
(1) The principle of a Single Banking Market; The export clause is an
exception to the principle of a single banking market and creates
obstacles to the exercise of the right of establishment and to the freedom
to provide services. Moreover, the fact that depositors of branches should
be covered by the guarantee-scheme of the host Member State introduces
discrimination between depositors of the same credit institution in case
of insolvency. It is therefore incompatible with the fact that, from both a
legal and a banking viewpoint, a credit institution and its branches
should be regarded as a single entity. It was against this background that
the Council and Parliament adopted the export prohibition clause only as
a transitory arrangement. The exception’s main justification was the
complex and unclear situation existing before the adoption of the
Directive.
(2) The developments of the banking sector; The banking sector has changed
considerably since the adoption of the directive, both as a result of the
harmonisation of guarantee schemes and as a result of financial
integration.
First, concerning the harmonisation of guarantee schemes, much has
happened during the transitional period, which ends on 31 December
1999. A regulatory minimum level of guarantee (€ 20 000) is established
in all Member States and the coverage of all branches – wherever
established – is acquired. It is true that the directive has not fully
harmonised the national guarantee levels and that certain differences will
remain even at the end of the transitional period. However, the directive
clearly establishes that it is the general principle of home country
guarantee level which prevails, without subordinating this guarantee level
to a harmonisation of national levels or conditions. Moreover it may be
interesting to note that also the national guarantee levels have converged.
Indeed, the more generous systems have reduced their level of cover6.
Thus, since 1994, a significant narrowing of the gap between the
guarantees offered by the various schemes has been carried out. In fact, by
the 1st of January 2000, all Member States but three will have a
compulsory guarantee level of between € 20.000 and 25.000 per depositor.
The only exceptions will be Denmark (€ 40.000), France (€ 60.000) and
Italy (€ 104.000).
To sum up, the large differences that existed at the moment of adoption of
the directive and which justified a temporary exception from the single
market principle do no longer prevail. Consequently the principal
justification to make an exception has disappeared.
The second trend in the banking market, which has important
consequences for the evaluation of the export prohibition clause, is the
6 Germany reduced its compulsory cover to the Community minimum for both the level and the
scope of cover (see table); Italy has reduced the limit in the level of cover to € 104.000 (from
€ 600.000 in 1994); finally, Finland has reduced its previous total guarantee to € 25.000.
8process of financial integration. This development has occurred on many
fronts in parallel. One of the factors has been the expansion of electronic
networks, which has promoted the introduction of electronic banking
services, facilitating cross-border trade. Another crucial factor has been
the introduction of the Euro, which has eliminated the exchange-rate risk
between eleven Member States. A third important factor is the trend
towards structural changes and consolidation in the banking market. By
means of mergers and acquisitions, banks have consolidated their position
so as to be able to compete internationally, also on a cross-border basis.
To sum up, the factors for integration have been strong in the last few
years and this is clearly going to continue.
In the process of financial integration the non-export clause is a residual
element which splits the Single Market into national markets. It needs to
be eliminated to promote a sound integration of the EU financial market.
Furthermore, the integration of the banking market means that cross-
border trade in banking services is gradually becoming a viable option for
domestic banking services. The consequence of this is that the export
prohibition clause can legally and easily be circumvented by cross-border
deposits, gradually reducing any competitive effect which deposit-
guarantee scheme might have at the domestic level7.
(3) No concrete estimate of potential disturbances; As for possible market
disturbances resulting from the expiration of the export prohibition
clause, no Member State has any objective and factual information which
might be used to support concrete concerns that such risks are likely or
significant. Nor are Member States able to specify or quantify the
potential market disturbances for domestic institutions in the event of an
expiration of the export prohibition clause.
On the contrary, the fact is that foreign branches – which are established
in Member States with a higher level of deposit guarantee compared to the
guarantee level in their country of origin – are hesitating to apply for the
higher cover of their host country (“topping-up”), even if this possibility is
offered to them on a non-discriminatory basis. There are even indications
that a certain number of foreign branches, which initially had participated
in topping-up schemes, have stopped doing so. There is thus a clear signal
that banks do not consider differences in guarantee levels as a significant
competitive factor.
(4) Respect of commercial publicity prohibition; Finally, no Member State
has registered cases of violation or an attempt of violation by a bank of
the prohibition in the directive to use differences in levels of deposit
guarantees in their commercial publicity.
7 The opinion of the experts is that at the present stage the different levels of deposit guarantee
schemes among Member States would not be crucial enough – at least during the present
relatively stable market conditions – as to offer depositors a significant incentive to circumvent an
export prohibition clause by cross-border deposits. However this may also be interpreted as an
indication of the fact that differences in the guarantee levels do not have crucial effects on
competition.
94. CONCLUSION
The deposit guarantee schemes in Member States have now been harmonised
according to the principles and objectives of the directive. Against this
background it seems disproportionate to prolong the export prohibition clause –
which could easily and legally be circumvented by cross-border deposits – in
order to avoid market disturbances that nobody could estimate or specify and
which seem improbable.
A prolongation of the export prohibition clause would mean that the protection
for such a remote risk would be considered more important than the completion
of the Single Market for bank services.
However, after the clause has expired (31 December 1999) the Commission will
closely monitor the evolution of the market, with particular attention to serious
market disturbances, on the basis of elements supplied by the national
authorities of Member States according to their preferences. The Commission
can then consider the possibility of proposing appropriate legislative measures.
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ANNEX I Main features of the EEA Deposit Guarantee Schemes
Deposits covered by certain guarantee schemes (application of Article 7(2))
1. Deposits by financial institutions that are members of the deposit guarantee scheme
are not covered in any Member State.
2. Deposits by insurance undertakings are covered in the following Member States :
DK, FIN, S and IS.
3. Deposits by government and central administrative authorities are covered in the
following Member States : DK, S, UK, NO and IS.
4. Deposits by provincial, regional, local and municipal authorities are covered in the
following Member States :DK, EL (except regional and provincial authorities), FIN
(municipal authorities only), S, UK, NO and IS.
5. Deposits by collective investment undertakings are covered in the following
Member States : DK, FIN, S, UK and IS.
6. Deposits by pension and retirement funds are covered in the following
Member States : DK, EL, FIN, S, UK, IS and IT.
7. Deposits by a credit institution’s own directors, managers, members personally liable
are covered as well as deposits of shareholders – unless such deposits amount to 5%
or more of the credit institution’s capital - in the following Member States : IRL
(20 %), FIN, S, NO, IS and UK (Building societies only) ; all of these countries also
cover deposits by the close relatives of the above and third parties acting on their
behalf. In Italy deposits by members personally liable are covered.
8. Deposits by other companies in the same group are covered in the following
Member States : DK, FIN, S, UK (Building societies only) and IS.
9. Non-nominative deposits are covered in the following Member States : DE, FR
(amounts representing means of payment issued), ÖS, S (if such deposits exist) and
UK (banks only and under certain conditions).
10. Deposits for which the depositor has obtained from the credit institution rates and
financial concessions which have helped to aggravate its financial situation do not
appear in the list of exclusions in the following Member States : DK, FIN, S and IS.
11. Debt securities issued by the credit institution and liabilities arising out of own
acceptances and promissory notes are covered in the following Member States: BE
(under certain conditions), PT (certificates of deposit only), NL (only debentures but
not promissory notes), NO (under certain conditions), S (under certain conditions)
and UK (banks only and under certain conditions).
11
12. Deposits in foreign currencies are covered in the following Member States: DK, EL,
ES, NL, LU, PT, FIN, IRL, IT, S, NO and IS. The Austrian scheme covers deposits in
currencies of other Member States belonging to the Euro-zone as well as deposits in
Euros.
13. Deposits by all legal persons are covered in the following Member States: DK, EL,
ES, FR, IT, FIN, S and UK.
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COUNTRY LAW OR ACT STATUS ADDRESS OF GUARANTEED DEPOSIT
INSTITUTE
AMOUNT GUARANTEED
BELGIUM (BE) - Act of 22-3-1993
- Public institution
established by Law
of 17-12-1998
Mixed: public/private Fonds de Protection des Depôts et des
Instruments Financiers
Avenue Berlaimont 14
B-1000 Brussels
Mr Debremaeker
Tel. ++32/2-221 38 92
Fax.++32/2-221 32 41
– € 15 000 until 31-12-1999
– € 20 000 from 1-1-2000
DENMARK (DK) Act No 415 of
26-6-1998
Private Garantifonden for indskydere og investorer
Niels Juels Gade 7
PO Box 2082
DK - 1013 København K
Mr Sørensen
Tel. ++45/33146245
DKK 300 000 = € 40 000
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COUNTRY LAW OR ACT STATUS ADDRESS OF GUARANTEED DEPOSIT
INSTITUTE
AMOUNT GUARANTEED
GERMANY (DE) Act of 16-7-1998
(BGBl 1998 Teil I
Nr 45, 22-7-1998)
Private
Private
Equivalent
Equivalent
Entschädigungseinrichtung deutscher Banken
GmbH, Postfach 040327
D - 10062 Berlin
Dr A. Weber / Mr Wintzen
Tel. ++49/30-590 01 19 60
Fax:++49/30-590 01 19 69
Entschädigungseinrichtung des
Bundesverbandes Öffentlicher Banken
Deutschlands GmbH
Postfach 201335
D - 53143 Bonn
Dr Lüthje / Mr Schoppmann
Tel. ++49/228-8192-200 or 260
Bundesverband der deutschen
Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken e.V.
Postfach 12 04 40
D-53046 Bonn
Dr Kessel / Mr Kollbach
Tel. ++49/228-509-283 or 256
Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband e.V.
Postfach 1429
D-53004 Bonn
Mr Fischer / Mr Newiger
Tel. ++49/228-204-330 or 333
90 % of all deposits covered up to a
maximum of € 20 000
90 % of all deposits covered up to a
maximum of € 20 000
Protection by the institute of 100 % of
deposits (alternative system)
Protection by the institute of 100 % of
deposits (alternative system)
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COUNTRY LAW OR ACT STATUS ADDRESS OF GUARANTEED DEPOSIT
INSTITUTE
AMOUNT GUARANTEED
GERMANY (DE) Voluntary
Voluntary
Voluntary
Voluntary
Einlagensicherungsfonds deutscher Banken
Bundesverband deutscher Banken e.V.
- Einlagensicherungsfonds –
Burgstraβe 28
D-10189 Berlin
Einlagensicherungsfonds des Bundesbandes
Öffentlicher Banken Deutschlands
Godesberger Allee 88
D-53175 Bonn
Bausparkassen-Einlagensicherungssystem e.V.
Dottendorfer Straβe 82
D-53129 Bonn
Einlagensicherungsfonds für Bank-
Bausparkassen
Fachverband für Bank-Bausparkassen
c/o Dresdner Bauspar AG
Am Sonnenplatz 1
D-61116 Bad Vibel
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COUNTRY LAW OR ACT STATUS ADDRESS OF GUARANTEED DEPOSIT
INSTITUTE
AMOUNT GUARANTEED
GREECE (EL) Act No 2324 of
17-7-1995
Mixed: public/private TAMEIO EGGYHSIS KATATHESEON
2-4 Sina St.
GR - 10672 Athens
Mr Liakopoulos
Tel ++301 363 9933
7932
5433
8339
5260
Fax ++301 363.5582
€ 20 000
(until 31-12-1999 – cooperatives not
covered by the scheme)
SPAIN (ES) Mixed Fondo de Garantía de Depósitos en
Establecimientos bancarios
Mr Aracil
Fondo de Garantía de Depósitos en Cajas de
Ahorro
Mr García Macarróu
Fondo de Garantía de Depósitos en Cooperativas
de Crédito
Mr García Macarróu
Address for all three institutes:
José Ortega y Gasset 22
E - Madrid 28006
Tel. ++35/1-4316645
Fax ++35/1-5755728
– € 15 000 until 31-12-1999
– € 20 000 from 1-1-2000
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COUNTRY LAW OR ACT STATUS ADDRESS OF GUARANTEED DEPOSIT
INSTITUTE
AMOUNT GUARANTEED
FRANCE (FR) Act No 94-679 of
8-8-1995
Order of 13-9-1995
Order of 26-2-1997
(Plan to create a single
fund)
Private
Private
Private
Equivalent
Equivalent
Association française des Banques
18, rue Lafayette
F - 75009 Paris
Mr Cornu – Mr Gourmelon
Tel. 33/1-48005252
Association Française des Sociétés financières
24, avenue de la Grande Armée
F - 75017 Paris
Mr Nasse
Tel. 33/1-47660277
Groupement des Institutions financières
spécialisées CEPME
27-31, avenue du Général Leclerc
F – 94710 Maisons Alfort
Caisse nationale de Crédit Agricole
91-93, Boulevard Pasteur
F – 75710 Paris Cedex 15
Mr L’Hyver
Chambre syndicale des Banques populaires
Le Ponant de Paris
5, rue Leblanc
F – 75511 Paris Cedex 15
Mr Crodot
- € 60 000
- € 60 000
- € 60 000
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COUNTRY LAW OR ACT STATUS ADDRESS OF GUARANTEED DEPOSIT
INSTITUTE
AMOUNT GUARANTEED
Equivalent
Equivalent
Equivalent
Confédération nationale de Crédit mutuel
88-90, rue Cardinet
F – 75847 Paris Cedex 17
Mr Desneux
Caisse centrale de Crédit coopératif
Parc de la Défense BP 211
33, rue des Trois Fontaneaux
F – 92002 Nanterre Cedex
Mr Bobin
Centre national des Caisses d’Épargne et de
Prévoyance
27-29, rue de la Tombe-Issoire
F – 75014 Paris
Mrs Bosquet
Chambre syndicale des Sociétés anonymes de
Crédit immobilier
2, r ue Lord Byron
F – 75384 Paris Cedex 8
IRELAND (IRL) Statutory Instrument
No 168 of 1995
Central Bank Act 1997
Section 81 (Annex I)
Public Central Bank of Ireland
PO Box 559
Dame Street
IRL - Dublin 2
Mr Dermot Finneran
(Banking Supervision Department)
Tel. ++353/1-671 6666
Fax ++353-1-6716561
90 % of all deposits covered up to a
maximum of € 15 000 until
31-12-1999 (€ 20 000 from 1.1.2000)
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COUNTRY LAW OR ACT STATUS ADDRESS OF GUARANTEED DEPOSIT
INSTITUTE
AMOUNT GUARANTEED
ITALY (IT) Act of
6 February 1996
(Article 23)
Legislative Decree 659
of 4 December 1996
Private
Private
Fondo interbancario di Tutela dei Depositi
Via del Plebiscito 102
I - 00186 Roma
Mr Savona - Mr Moretti
Tel. ++39/6-99861
Fax ++39/6-48295414
Fondo di Garanzia dei Depositanti del Credito
cooperativo
Via Massimo d’Azeglio
I – 00184 Roma
Mr Franco Caleffi
Tel. ++39/6-482951
Fax ++39/6-48295414
ITL 200 million = € 103 291.38
ITL 200 million = € 103 291.38
LUXEMBOURG
(L)
Act of 11 June 1997
(amending the Act of
5 April 1993)
Private Association pour la Garantie des Dépôts au
Luxembourg (AGDL)
20, rue de la Poste BP 241
L – 2012 Luxembourg
Mr Jean-Jacques Rommes
Tel: ++352/4636601
Fax ++352/460921
€ 15 000 until 31-12-1999
€ 20 000 from 1-1-2000
NETHERLANDS
(NL)
Act of 14-12-1995
Royal Order of
15-12-1995 replaced
by Royal Order of
25-6-1996 replaced by
Royal Order of
21-9-1998 and
28-9-1998
Private De Nederlandsche Bank NV
PO Box 98
NL – 1000 AB Amsterdam
Mr R.J. Theissen
Tel. ++31/20-5243924
Fax ++31/20-5242876
€ 20 000
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COUNTRY LAW OR ACT STATUS ADDRESS OF GUARANTEED DEPOSIT
INSTITUTE
AMOUNT GUARANTEED
AUSTRIA (ÖS) Act of 22-8-1996 Private
Private
Private
Private
Private
Einlagensicherung der Banken und Bankiers
Gesellschaft m.b.H.
Börsegasse 11
A - 1013 Wien
Mr Harald Rassl
Tel. 43/1-535.17.71.32
Sparkassen- Haftungs Aktiengesellschaft
Grimmelshausengasse 1
A - 1030 Wien
Mr Alfred Pachernigg
Tel. 43/1-711.69.292
Österreichische Raiffeisen-Einlagensicherung
reg. Gen m.b.H.
Hollandstraße 2
A - 1020 Wien
Mr Gerhard Bittner
Tel. 43/1-211.36.0
Schulze-Delitzsch-Haftungs-genossenschaft reg.
Gen. m.b.H.
Schottengasse 10
A - 1010 Wien
Mr Kurt Grossauer
Tel. 43/1-313.28.2213
Hypo-Haftungsgesellschaft m.b.H.
Brucknerstraße 8
A - 1040 Wien
Mr Dietmar Rupar
Tel. 43/1-505.87.32.0
90 % cover for legal persons
ATS 260 000
€ 20 000
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COUNTRY LAW OR ACT STATUS ADDRESS OF GUARANTEED DEPOSIT
INSTITUTE
AMOUNT GUARANTEED
PORTUGAL (PT) Decree-Law
No 298/92 of
31-12-1992 as
amended by
Decree-Law
No 246/95 of
14-9-1995
Decree-Law No
345/98 of 09-11-1998
replacing the Decree-
Law No 182/87 and
322/97.
Public/Private Fundo de Garantia de Depositos
Avenida da Republica 57 – 8°
P - 1050 –189 Lisboa
Dr Mario Remédio
Tel. ++351/1-7925735 and 36
Fax ++351/1-7942001
Fundo de Garantia do Crédito
Agricola Mútuo
Praça de Liberdade, 92
Apartado 4038-4001 Porto Codex
Tel ++351/2 – 2059977
Fax++351/2-2004420
Since 1999-06-22 : €25 000
Since 1998-12-12: €25 000
FINLANDE (FIN) Act No 1229/1997
amending the Credit
Institutions Act
(Section 65 brought
into force on 1-1-
1998)
Private Finnish Deposit-Guarantee Scheme
Museokatu 8A
P.O. Box 1009
SF – 00101 Helsinki
Mrs Leena Linnainmaa
Tel ++358-940561244
Fax ++358-940561291
FIM 150 000 = € 25 000
SWEDEN (S) Act 1995/1571
(brought into force on
1-1-1996)
Public Insättningsgarantinämnden
Regeringsgatan 48
Box 7369, S-103 90 Stockholm
Mr Hans Jacobson (President)
Mr Thomas Norling (Director)
Tel. ++46/8-7878100, Fax :++46/8-241335
SEK 250 000 = € 25 000
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UNITED
KINGDOM (UK)
Banking Act 1987
Building Societies Act
1986
(Plan to merge the two
schemes)
Public Deposit Protection Board
25 The North Colonnade
Canary Wharf
GB – London E14 9HS
Mr Howard Davis (Chairman)
Mrs Lisa Robinson (Director)
Tel ++44/171-6760972
Fax ++44/171-6760973
Building Societies Investor Protection Scheme
25 The North Colonnade
Canary Wharf
GB – London E14 9HS
Mr Geoffrey Fitchew (Chairman)
Mr Norman Digance (Director)
Tel ++44/171-6760398
Fax ++44/171-676
90 % of all deposits covered up to a
maximum of UKL 20 000 (€ 22 222)
Same cover
ICELAND (IS) Act No 113 of
12-7-1996
(Merger of the two
funds envisaged)
Private
Private
The Commercial Banks’
Deposit Guarantee Fund
Kalkofnsvegi 1
ISL - 150 Reykjavik
The Savings Banks’
Deposit Guarantee Fund
Raudararstig 27
ISL - 105 Reykjavik
ISK 1.7 million = € 20 000
ISK 1.7 million= € 20 000
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LIECHTENSTEIN
(LIE)
Act No 108/1992
Act No 22/1994
Private Dienststelle für Bankenaufsicht
Verwaltungsgebäude 4 b
FL - 9490 Vaduz
CHF 30 000
NORWAY (NOR) Act No 75 of
6-12-1996
Mixed: public/private
Mixed: Public/private
Forretningsbankenes sikringsfond
Hansteensgt 2
PO Box 2403
Solli, N-0201 Oslo
Sparebankenes sikringsfond
PO Box 6772
St. Olavs Plass
N - 0130 Oslo
NOK 2 million (€ 250 000)
